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XAAZ-15490

SR/2-B-61-444

7 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/2

SUBJECT : Baltic REDSKIN Review

In accordance with your suggestion, the attached review of Baltic REDSKIN operations has been made. Although the 1961 REDSKIN season has been covered in detail, for purposes of comparison, frequent reference has been made to previous Baltic REDSKIN operations conducted in 1959 and 1960. It is hoped that this review will prove of value for planning and review purposes.

ACSR/2/Baltic

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ATTACHMENT  
SR/2-B-61-444

## I. SPOTTING NETS

### A. Lithuanian

1. Neither of the two 1960 Lithuanian REDSKIN agents was formally spotted for recruitment through SR/2/Baltic/Lithuanian spotting nets but came to our attention in other fashion. [ ] had previously been used by SR/2/Baltic in Vienna in 1959 during the World Youth Festival and AEBALCONY/3 was a long term contact of SR/10 who was transferred to SR/2 when his travel plans became known. At this time (1960) the only spotters were the political leaders of VLIK who really did not appear overly interested in the entire program.

2. During the winter of 1960-61 a major effort was made to develop a Lithuanian spotting net on the Eastern seaboard in the hope that it would produce a number of REDSKIN leads. Fourteen individuals were chosen, contacted, assessed and recruited for this purpose in the large Eastern centers of Lithuanian population. In addition to spotting three 1961 REDSKIN travellers, the net provided background information on other REDSKINNERS and a variety of support-type information. Regular contact was maintained through mail and telephone channels.

3. During the coming winter (1961-62) the existing spotting assets will be personally recontacted and reevaluated and additional assets will be recruited in areas of Lithuanian population not as yet covered. Emigre leaders who are witting of CIA REDSKIN operations will also continue their efforts, which to date have left much to be desired.

### B. Estonian

1. The Estonian spotting net was initially composed of emigre leaders ([ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] and [ ]). In 1960 an architect ([ ]) was recruited in Cleveland and in 1961 a college professor ([ ]) was picked up in Akron. At least one other candidate is now ready for assessment as a spotter ([ ]).

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2. The Estonian emigre spotters proposed three candidates in 1961. Two of these did not pass the initial assessment and the third, AEBALCONY/6, the holder of a valid visa, was refused hotel space by INTOURIST. A 1960 candidate (L 7) was spotted directly by a C.O., L 7

C. Latvian

REDSKIN operations into Soviet occupied Latvia were greatly hampered in 1959 and 1960 because there was no independent spotting mechanism in being. To eliminate this situation, sixteen spotters were recruited and organized during late 1960 and the beginning of 1961. The spotters are well distributed geographically throughout the entire United States. No REDSKIN travel leads as such have been received from the spotters as yet but recontacts by the case officers have been made on a continuing basis. Included in the spotting net are leading Latvian emigre leaders and four Latvian REDSKIN agents who were previously dispatched from Europe. These four individuals now reside in the United States where they are serving as spotters as well as subtle promoters of REDSKIN travel. It is expected that the net will become productive of leads provided the present international situation does not severely limit tourist travel to the USSR. It is expected that one additional spotter will be added to the net shortly.

II. AGENT SPOTTING, ASSESSMENT, AND TRAINING

A. The following table provides all of the necessary information concerning this element of REDSKIN activity:

1. REDSKIN agents spotted and assessed by C.O.

	<u>Estonian</u>	<u>Latvian</u>	<u>Lithuanian</u>
1959	0	1	0
1960	1 (L 7)	12	2
1961	3	7	8

2. REDSKIN agents psychologically assessed by OTR

1959	0	0	0
1960	0	0	0
1961	0	4	5

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### 3. REDSKIN agents trained

	<u>Estonian</u>	<u>Latvian</u>	<u>Lithuanian</u>
1959	0	1	0
1960	1	2	2
1961	1	2	7

### 4. Numbers of hours of training

AEBALCONY/1 (Latvian) - 14 (1960)  
 AEBALCONY/2 (Estonian) - 30 (1960)  
 AEBALCONY/3 (Lithuanian) - 40 (1960)  
 AEBALCONY/4 (Latvian) - Field (1960)  
 \*AEBALCONY/5 (Latvian) - 12 (1961)  
 AEBALCONY/6 (Estonian) - 45 (1961)  
 AEBALCONY/7 (Lithuanian) - 45 (1961)  
 AEBALCONY/8 (Lithuanian) - 45 (1961)  
 AEBALCONY/9 (Lithuanian) - 45 (1961)  
 AEBALCONY/10 (Lithuanian) - 30 (1961)  
 \*\*AEBALCONY/11 (Latvian) - none (1961)  
 AEBALCONY/12 (Lithuanian) - 5 (1961)  
 AEBALCONY/13 (Lithuanian) - 5 (1961)  
 \*\*\*AEBALCONY/14 (Lithuanian) - none (1961)  
 [ ] (Latvian) - 40 (1959)  
 AEKILO/[ ] (Latvian) - 16 (1960)  
 AEFLAG/[ ] (Latvian) - 40 (1961)  
 [ ] (Lithuanian) - 30 (1960-61)  
 [ ] (Lithuanian) - 40 (1960)

\* Added training by MOG

\*\* No report from MOG

\*\*\* CE overtones

B. It should be noted that on at least two occasions the assessments of the OTR psychological staff proved drastically inaccurate (AEKILO, and AEBALCONY/14), and in two other cases left something to be desired (AEBALCONY/8 and AEBALCONY/10). While serving a useful function, such assessments should be used as a tool and should in no way replace the C.O. assessment.

## III. C.O. TRAINING AND IMPROVEMENT

A. There is much to be said for having all case officers equipped with skills which allow them to fully train, brief and debrief a

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REDSKIN agent. However, operating conditions in the United States make this virtually impossible in practice, since the majority of training is accomplished on weekends during the months of May, June and July. Experience has proven that a case officer loses his "sparkle" after four hours of instruction and that the agents also tire of hearing the same voice. Therefore, a senior case officer was assigned the overall training responsibility and he called upon all the other members of SR/2/Baltic for assistance in lecturing, surveillance and other practical problems. This "team" approach has worked well and post mortem reviews revealed that the agents were well satisfied and felt themselves well equipped to handle their operational assignments. C/SR/2/Baltic also served a most valuable function, that of a prestige factor, and he normally was in no way involved in the actual training. He appeared following the initial case officer and psychological assessment and at the final briefing.

B. All of the SR/2/Baltic personnel profited to some degree from the REDSKIN training and problems which they conducted and observed or in which they participated. More than two hundred and twenty hours of instruction were given during 1961.

In 1961 some use was also made of [ ] and [ ], both of whom gave lectures on Baltic Reality with emphasis upon the geographical areas they knew first hand.

#### IV. REDSKIN TRAVELLERS

##### A. Lithuanian

1. Although some Americans did travel to Soviet occupied Lithuania in 1959 they were primarily Communist in political outlook and included no REDSKIN agents. In 1960 two agents were trained, briefed and dispatched, [ ] and AERBALCONY/3, both of whom had been long time CIA contacts. The former was a fully "mounted" operation and the latter was of the "piggy-back" variety since the agent had received a travel grant from an educational foundation.

2. In 1961 seven Lithuanian REDSKIN assets were in contact with SR/2/Baltic at the time of their travel to Soviet occupied Lithuania. Four of these individuals (AERBALCONY/7, 8 and 9 and [ ] were "mounted" operations. [ ], Lithuanian born, renounced her Soviet citizenship before her visa was granted. Two (AERBALCONY/12 and 13) were of the "piggy-back" variety and one (AERBALCONY/14) was merely a disposal contact because of certain CE overtones. All of these individuals, except AERBALCONY/14, were given training and an operational briefing and all were debriefed

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upon their return to the United States.

**B. Latvian**

In 1959 the Latvian desk was successful in dispatching a single REDSKIN agent, [ ] , but because of visa difficulties no travellers were sent in 1960. In 1961 AEFLAG/1 was dispatched to the USSR and his itinerary included visits to Tallinn and Riga. AEFLAG/1 has been a contact of the Latvian Desk for six years and had been attempting to visit Latvia for CIA since 1958. The frustrations brought about by his failure to acquire a visa in 1958 and his inability to travel in 1960 were compensated for to some extent through this year's trip. In addition AEBALCONY/5 and her husband, AEBALCONY/11, were dispatched by MOG after spotting, assessment, recruitment and initial training at Headquarters.

**C. Estonian**

1. Although to date there have been no Estonian REDSKIN travellers, AEBALCONY/6 was recruited and fully trained in 1961. He was granted a Soviet visa in Stockholm but since INTOURIST refused to grant him any hotel space, he did not enter the USSR. AEBALCONY/2, a San Francisco engineer, was recruited in 1960 and was trained in Washington but was not granted a Soviet visa and did not travel.

2. Two other Estonians, [ ] and [ ] who travelled to Estonia from Finland in 1960 and 1959, respectively, are American citizens and were debriefed but were not dispatched by SR/2/Baltic.

[ ] was  
[ ] was  
[ ]

**V. REDSKIN PRODUCTION**

The REDSKIN operations into the Baltic area produced the following results:

- a) fourteen dead drop sites were spotted in the Baltic capitals of Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius. Several of them will probably be used to support "internal cases" and the remainder may be used operationally by SR/9.
- b) thirteen page "PI" report resulted from the AEFLAG/[ ] operation and several other reports (including missile site locations) were received from other agents and were published as well, even though in mid-season C/SR ordered that no more missile indicator briefing be given.
- c) a tremendous amount of OI, including document intelligence, resulted from the operations and is being distributed to SR/6.

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- d) Personality reports were received on about one hundred individuals, several of whom appear to be worthy of future recontact, reassessment, and possible recruitment. Other personality reports increased CIA's knowledge of INTOURIST and other Communist officials in the Baltic States.
- e) First travel reports were received for the first time from two members of an American-Communist travel group and from a tour leader of a group of old people from Boston.

When comparing the limited amount of knowledge which SR/2/Baltic had received on the Baltic States from previous REDSKIN travellers before April 1961 with the knowledge which has been obtained in the past six months, it is evident that the Baltic REDSKIN season had a certain degree of success.

#### VI. OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY PROBLEMS

A. The Baltic REDSKIN programs of 1959 and 1960 were greatly hampered by the refusal of the Soviets to grant visas which permitted travel. The situation changed in 1961 and in fact two operations (AEBALCONY/6 and AEBALCONY/10) were not mounted even though Soviet visas had been granted.

B. Although [ ] claimed she had been surveilled and AEBALCONY/3 admitted he had been provoked in 1960, none of the 1961 REDSKIN travellers, with two minor exceptions, appears to have had any difficulty. This is because of the strict defensive briefings which were given as well as the strict prohibition against utilizing "spy camera" techniques and against making any operational notes.

C. The only evidence of unusual security force interest this year concerned AEFLAG/[ ]'s debriefing by customs' officials in Moscow as he exited and AEBALCONY/8 and 9's minor brush with a block agitator while using a polaroid camera (without C.O. approval) in a factory district in Vilnius.

D. For the sake of the record, it should also be remarked that [ ] has been approached in the past by the UB and is distantly related to the "probable" KGB agent, Richardas VAIGAUSKAS, currently a member of the Soviet delegation to the U.N. [ ] was debriefed in thorough fashion upon her return and, although visibly shaken emotionally by her visit to her parents and sisters, does not appear to be concealing secret KGB contacts. The only unusual aspect of her trip was that she was granted a three day visa extension which enabled her to visit Moscow prior to exiting the USSR and following her fifteen day visit to Lithuania. Her exit point

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was also changed from Leningrad to Moscow. In spite of these abnormalities, [ ] was able to account for all of her time in Moscow and does not appear to have been KGB-briefed.

# VII. FINANCIAL ANNEX

The following "rough" financial accounting has been made of SR/2/Baltic REDSKIN activity and, while it does consider G.O. travel expenditures, it does not consider G.O. time and salary.

## a. REDSKIN agents assessed and dropped:

[ ]	\$ 150.00	
[ ]	150.00	
AERILA,	200.00	
[ ]	100.00	
[ ]	250.00	
[ ]	100.00	
		TOTAL
		\$ 950.00

## b. Spotting nets:

Estonian	\$ 400.00	
Latvian	2000.00	
Lithuanian	1000.00	
		TOTAL
		\$ 3400.00

## c. REDSKIN agents:

(Latvian)	AERFLAG,	\$ 1300.00	
	*AERBALCONY/5	500.00	
	*AERBALCONY/11	50.00	
(Estonian)	**AERBALCONY/6	700.00	
(Lithuanian)	AERBALCONY/7	2000.00	
	AERBALCONY/8	2000.00	
	AERBALCONY/9	2000.00	
	***AERBALCONY/10	400.00	
	****AERBALCONY/12	250.00	
	****AERBALCONY/13	250.00	
	****AERBALCONY/14	400.00	
	[ ]	1700.00	
		TOTAL	\$11550.00
		GRAND TOTAL	\$16,800.00

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- \* - "Piggy-back" and MOB gave final briefing and did debriefing
- \*\* - Subject refused hotel space by INTOURIST but obtained vis in Stockholm
- \*\*\* - Subject's mission cancelled
- \*\*\*\* - "Piggy-back"

#### VIII. POTENTIAL 1962 REDSKIN TRAVELLERS

A. SR/2/Baltic already has a nucleus of REDSKIN candidates spotted and cleared for use in 1962 if the situation warrants. These include:

1. Estonian: AEBALCONY/2 (visa problem)

2. Latvian: AEFLAG (repeat)

AEBALCONY/1 (visa problem)

3. Lithuanian:

AEBALCONY/10

B. It is hoped that, if conditions warrant, some of these people may be used in 1962

1. to "load" dead drops for internal Baltic "cases";
2. to contact, assess and recruit Baltic residents who have access to "R and D" information and long range Soviet military and/or missile plans; and
3. to act as CA agents whose sole mission is to spread the gospel of democracy and truth while countering the Soviet ideology and the enforced ignorance of the Baltic people concerning international events.

#### IX. INTERNAL BALTIC TARGETS SUITABLE FOR CONTACT OR RECONTACT

A. The following summary can be made:

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1. Internal cases awaiting recontact or dead drop material:

Estonian - 0  
Latvian - 2  
Lithuanian - 1

2. Internal targets for contact and recruitment:

Estonian - 0  
Latvian - 2  
Lithuanian - 3

B. An attempt will be made to expand the list of internal targets, but at the present time the situation does not appear too promising.

X. CONCLUSION

A. The Baltic States and the Kaliningrad Oblast remain a priority military target area and the Baltic people remain unique in that they are the residents of the "world's newest colonies". Operational activity into the Baltic area has historically been difficult because the Soviets refused to grant permission to Westerners to visit the area until 1959 and then allowed tourists to visit only Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius. In addition, the Soviets have, until recently, refused to grant visas to residents of the United States who exited the Baltic States after 1939. They do this on the grounds that such individuals are still Soviet citizens and will remain so until they formally renounce their Soviet citizenship. ☐ did in fact formally renounce her citizenship.

B. However, in spite of these difficulties, a number of mature REDSKIN agents have been dispatched during the past year. All of them have been fairly fluent in at least one Baltic language and have provided CIA with some valuable information.

C. The cost of the REDSKIN program in terms of money (\$17,000) and the time effort (adjusted) of five case officers appears to have been warranted when the results are balanced against other SR/2/Baltic activity, e.g., ☐ ☐, which costs about ☐ ☐ per year and involves the full time effort of three (adjusted) principal agents and two case officers and whose "product effectiveness" it is impossible to judge. Of course, there are differences in objectives and criteria of effectiveness involved here (FI and CA problem) which are too obvious to mention, yet the comparison may warrant some consideration.

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	Third Nationals	Americans
1961	38	8
1960	30	11
1959	48	23
1958	2	8
1957	<u>—</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	118	51